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July, 1953
is in the re-evaluation of the social ideal of exaggerated free com-
petition. Thus to the degree that the re-evaluation is smoldering
perhaps Dean Pound is justified in asserting that we are dissatis-
fied with our social ideal of the present day.5 3 And to that degree
also perhaps that social ideal either has or will fail. The writer
submits, however, that a proper division of the economy into the
several levels of business activity can preserve the social ideal
of free competition while at the same time it can stimulate rather
than destroy the energetic impulses and individual initiatives
which always have insured the preservation of our fundamental
American concepts.
INCOME TAX ON ALIMONY
SYDNEY E. SHUTERAN,
of the Denver Bar
Lawyers engaged in domestic relations and tax cases have
been confronted with doubt and uncertainty as to the taxability
of alimony received during the period for which an interlocutory
decree is effective. Another tax problem concerning the same pe-
riod is the right of the husband and wife to file a joint return if,
at the end of the taxable year, a final decree of divorce has not
been entered.
The case of Alice Humphreys Evans v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue,1 held that alimony received by the wife prior to
the entry of a final decree of divorce in the State of Colorado is
not taxable to the wife and, likewise, not deductible by the husband.
Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code prescribes the
circumstances under which alimony and separate maintenance pay-
ments are includable in the gross income of the wife. To qualify
under section 22(k) the payments must be received by the wife
under the following circumstances:
(a) The payments must be received by a wife who is divorced
or legally separated from her husband under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance.
(b) They must be periodic payments received subsequent to
such divorce.
(c) They must be in discharge of legal obligation imposed
upon or incurred by such husband.
(d) The legal obligation must be imposed or incurred because
of the marital or family relationship.
(e) Such obligation must be imposed or incurred under such
decree or under a written instrument incident to such
divorce or separation.
For Dean Pound's latest contribution to the field of social jurisprudence,
the reader is referred to the August, 1952 edition of the American Bar Associa-
tion Journal in which the problem of the function of the law school is con-
sidered.
19 T. C., No. 126 (March 20, 1953).
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The Code provision does not define "divorce". In the Evans'
case, supra, the wife did not include in her gross income alimony
received during the effective period of the interlocutory decree of
divorce entered in the District Court in and for the City and
County of Denver, State of Colorado. As a result, a deficiency
assessment was levied by the revenue agent on the alleged grounds
of understatement of alimony income and determined in the assess-
ment that the taxpayer occupied a single status for the entire
year which includes the period of time prior to the final decree
of divorce. A petition was filed with the Tax Court of the United
States for a re-determination of the deficiency. The Bureau inter-
preted "decree of divorce" as contained in section 22(k) to mean
an interlocutory decree of divorce and relied upon I. T. 3761 (C. B.
1945, 76) :
Advice is requested whether periodic payments re-
ceived by a wife from her husband pursuant to an inter-
locutory decree of divorce in the State of California are
includable in the gross income of the wife under section
22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code and deductible by
the husband under section 23(u) of the Code.
It is held that periodic payments made pursuant to
an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of Cali-
fornia by a husband for the support of his wife are in-
cludable in her gross income under section 22(k) of the
Internal Revenue Code, and are deductible by the husband
under section 23(u) of the Code.
Whether an "interlocutory decree of divorce" effects a di-
vorce of the parties and is therefore a true "decree of divorce"
depends upon its substantive effect on matrimonial status under
the pertinent local law. Whether an interlocutory decree of di-
vorce creates a legal separation or is a form of decree of separate
maintenance also depends upon its real attributes as set forth in
the pertinent local law.
In the proceeding before the Court the pertinent local law
consisted of the statutes and decisions of the Courts of the State
of Colorado.
The Tax Court opinion in the Evans' case, supra, set out fully
sections 13 and 17 of Chapter 56, Volume 2, 1935 Colorado Stat-
utes Annotated. These sections provide essentially that during
the interlocutory period the parties shall not be divorced and
that six months after the entry of an interlocutory decree, it shall
be and become a final decree of divorce. In determining the effect
of a Colorado interlocutory decree the Court cited the following:
If, during the period of the interlocutory decree, one
of the parties dies, the surviving spouse is entitled to let-
ters of administration since the divorce action abates
with the death of one of the parties and there is no "status
of marriage" upon which a decree of divorce can operate.
2
In re McLaughlin's Estate, 117 Colo. 67, 184 P. 2d 130 (1947).
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Under the statute and the express provisions of the inter-
locutory decree, the parties were still married and might lawfully
have cohabited together as husband and wife.
3
Although not referred to in the opinion, it was also argued
in the Evans' case, supra, that the property settlement agreement
provided for specific payments from the date of the interlocutory
decree to the date of the final decree, and provided separately for
the payments to be effective if and when the final decree was en-
tered. As a result the alimony payments did not qualify as peri-
odic payments required by section 22(k) because they were made
for a definite period of time and under the Code provisions are
considered to be "installment payments" and not "periodic pay-
ments". Consequently, there is no need in the preparation of a
property settlement agreement to provide separately for alimony
payments to be made during the period of the interlocutory de-
cree unless the amount to be paid is to change upon the entry of
the final decree of divorce.
In the case of Martiner S. Eccles,4 the taxpayer's wife was
granted an interlocutory decree of divorce in the State of Utah
on August 2, 1949, and the decree became final after the expira-
tion of six months. The laws of the State of Utah are substan-
tially the same as those of Colorado in regard to the entry of
the interloctutory and final decrees of divorce. The Tax Court
held that the taxpayer and his wife were still husband and wife
at the close of the taxable year 1949 and were thus entitled to file
a joint return under section 51(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Depending upon other conditions, it now will become neces-
sary to determine whether or not you want the final decree to
enter prior or subsequent to the end of the taxable year. This
problem could result in a hitherto unknown eagerness to have an
interlocutory decree entered or, in the alternative, procrastination
greater than that for which lawyers are now noted.
NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR TO SPEAK
AT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
The Judicial Conference for the Tenth Circuit will be held
at the Stanley Hotel, in Estes Park, Thursday, Friday, and Satur-
day, July 16, 17, and 18, 1953.
The banquet will be held Friday evening, July 17, at 7 p.m.
The speaker will be The Honorable Leslie Knox Munro, a native
of New Zealand, and now Ambassador to the United States from
that country. He is a permanent representative to the United
Nations.
Reservations should be made before July 13 with Mr. George
J. Stobie, Manager of the Stanley Hotel.
'Doty v. Doty, 103 Colo. 543, 88 P. 2d 573, 574 (1939).
S19 T. C ....... (March 11, 1953).
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